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The Court of Appeals of Maryland held in 
Sheppard v. State, 344 Md. 143, 
685 A.2d 1176 (1996), that ajudge 
may not prohibit a driver from 
operating a motor vehicle as a 
condition of a three-year term of 
probation. The ruling by the court 
of appeals made clear that, 
although judges generally may 
exercise broad discretion when 
imposing conditions of probation, 
a judge cannot prohibit a driver 
from operating a motor vehicle as 
part of probation, since the 
legislature has delegated the aut-
hority of licensing drivers to the 
Motor Vehicles Administration. 
The ruling by the court of appeals 
clarified the preemption and 
separation of powers issues that 
arose when the trial judge over-
stepped his authority by attempting 
to suspend a driver's license as 
part of a probation term. 
Frances Diana Sheppard 
("Sheppard") was convicted of two 
counts of driving under the 
influence of alcohol for offenses 
occurring on August 23, 1994 and 
March 6, 1995, pursuant to the 
Transportation Article, section 21-
902(b) of the Annotated Code of 
Maryland. Among the conditions 
of her probation, the trial judge 
prohibited Sheppard from operat-
ing a motor vehicle during her 
three-year probation term. This 
requirement imposed particular 
hardships for Sheppard, because 
she did not live near public trans-
portation and she wanted to return 
to work as a registered nurse. 
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Prior to this case, Sheppard had 
been arrested for driving under the 
influence of alcohol in 1982 and 
1983. 
After being convicted in the 
Circuit Court for Worcester 
County, Sheppard appealed her 
case to the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland on the single 
issue of whether a trial judge may 
lawfully prohibit a defendant, 
convicted of driving under the 
influence, from operating a motor 
vehicle for a three-year term of 
probation. The Court of Appeals 
of Maryland, on its own motion, 
issued a writ of certiorari to review 
the case. 
The court of appeals began its 
analysis by acknowledging that 
under Maryland law a trial judge 
has broad discretion in imposing 
conditions of probation, but that 
this power is not unlimited. 
Sheppard, 344 Md. at 145, 685 
A.2d at 1177 (citing MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 27, § 639(a)(1996)). 
The court noted that other states 
were divided as to whether the 
vehicle code deprives courts from 
suspending a driver's license. Id. 
at 146, 685 A.2d at 1177. The 
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court pointed out that some states 
have permitted trial judges to 
suspend a driver's license as a 
condition of probation when the 
legislature has expressly granted 
the power to the trial court. Id. at 
147,685 A.2d at 1177. According 
to the court, the issue in the case at 
bar hinged on the preemption and 
separation of powers controversy 
between the judiciary and a legi-
slature. Id. at 146, 685 A.2d at 
1177. 
The court began to resolve the 
issue by comparing Sheppard with 
Towers v. State, 92 Md. App. 183, 
607 A.2d 105 (1992), a case in 
which a pharmacist was placed on 
probation with the condition that 
he not work in a pharmacy without 
the court's permission, even ifthe 
State Board of Pharmacy rein-
stated his license to 'practice. 
Sheppard at 147, 685 A.2d at 
1178. In its analysis, the Towers 
court stated that "[w]e are dealing 
with overlapping circles of author-
ity that are statutorily based, and it 
is therefore to the respective 
statutes that we must first tum." 
Sheppard at 147,685 A.2d at 1178 
(quoting Towers, 92 Md. App. at 
189-90, 607 A.2d at 108). To 
support its position that the legi-
slature had delegated the power to 
restore Towers' license to the 
Maryland State Pharmacy Board, 
the Towers court relied on u.s. v. 
Sterber, 846 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 
1988). Sheppard at 148, 685 A.2d 
at 1178 (citing Towers v. State, 92 
Md: App. at 193-94, 607 A.2d at 
110). From Towers, the Sheppard 
27.2 U. Bait. L.F. 81 
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court concluded that it must first 
determine whether the legislature 
intended for the courts to be able 
to suspend drivers' licenses as part 
of probation. Id. at 148, 685 A.2d 
at 1178. 
In examining the Trans-
portation Article of the Annotated 
Code of Maryland, the court 
looked at statutes that govern how 
long a driver's license may be 
suspended when one is convicted 
of driving under the influence, and 
when a driver's license may be 
reinstated. Id. at 149-51, 685 A.2d 
1179-80. In the instant case, the 
judge's three year suspension was 
longer than any suspension term in 
the statutes. Id. at 149-50, 685 
A.2d 1179 (citing MD. CODE ANN., 
TRANSPORTATION § 16-404(c)(2) 
(1996)). The statutes also specify 
certain time periods that a driver 
must wait before applying for rein-
statement of her driver's license, 
and in more serious cases the 
Motor Vehicle Administration 
("MY A") may undertake an inves-
tigation of the driver's habits and 
abilities before reinstating his 
license. Id. at 150-51, 685 A.2d 
1179-80 (citing MD. CODE ANN., 
TRANSPORTATION § 16-208(b) 
(1996)). Thus, the trial judge's 
suspension of Sheppard's driver's 
license was contrary to Maryland 
law, because the statutes did not 
enable the trial judge to suspend a 
driver's license for three years and 
because the legislature has enacted 
specific laws that empower the 
MV A to suspend or reinstate a 
driver's license. Id. at 151, 685 
A.2d 1180. 
Finally, the court bolstered its 
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analysis with a number of deci-
sions where the court of special 
appeals ruled that the trial court 
exceeded its jurisdiction, similar to 
the trial judge in the present case. 
Id. at 151-53, 685 A.2d at 1180-
81. In Smith v. Smith, the court 
held that the trial court could not 
prohibit a convicted child abuser 
from seeking custody of her child-
ren, because the Juvenile Court 
had jurisdiction over this matter. 
Sheppard at 152, 685 A.2d at 1180 
(citing Smith v. Smith, 80 Md. 
App. 371, 374, 563 A.2d 1129, 
1130 (1989)). Similarly, the court 
used In Re David K to explain that 
if the trial court suspended a 
driver's license, the MVA would 
not be able to keep track of who 
was licensed to drive. Sheppard at 
153,685 A.2d 1181 (citing In Re 
David K, 48 Md. App. 714, 723-
25,429 A.2d 313, 318-19 (1981)). 
In the dicta of In Re David K, the 
court also noted that the defendant 
could enter into a voluntary agree-
ment to surrender his license as 
part of his probation, but the 
Sheppard court said that this was 
not an issue for Sheppard because 
she appealed the condition of her 
probation. Sheppard at 153-54, 
685 A.2d 1181 (citing In Re David 
K, 48 Md. App. at 721-22, 429 
A.2d at 317). 
Sheppard v. State sends a clear 
message to trial judges not to sus-
pend the driver's license of a 
person convicted of drunk driving 
as part of a probation term, unless 
authorized by statute. The court 
based its ruling on the notion that 
a trial judge cannot usurp the 
power of the MV A to suspend a 
driver's license, even if they are 
tempted by the public's demand to 
keep drunk drivers off the road. 
